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I. A Year of Painful Progress in the Middle East: 2002 Legal
Year in Review"
The War on Terrorism, a looming war with Iraq, and the continued escalation of violence
between Israelis and Palestinians dominated the political and economic climate of the Middle East in 2002, much as it had the previous year.
After the successful military campaign by the United States against the Taliban and alQaeda in Afghanistan, many members of the terrorist organization fled to and now operate
in Pakistan. However, the United States and its allies in the war continued to have great
success with tracking down members of the group and thwarting plans of additional terror.
This success was capped with the capture of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the number three
man in the network. Despite this success, al-Qaeda showed a willingness to continue its
campaign of terror with soft targets, such as tourist locales in Kenya, Bali, Karachi, and
Tunisia. As the U.S. Government has stated on many occasions, the War on Terrorism will
continue for the foreseeable future.
The War on Terrorism, specifically the worldwide crackdown on al-Qaeda, continues to
see more activity on the part of America's allies. On February 18, 2003, Saudi Interior
Minister, Prince Nayef Bin Abdulaziz, announced that ninety Saudi nationals would stand
trial, accused of membership in al-Qaeda. Prince Abdulaziz also said that 250 other nationals were being detained pending an investigation into their connections to Osama bin
Laden. He gave no further details about the charges or the dates at which they would stand
trial.

rJimPhipps organized the 2002 Year-in-Review report on developments in Middle Eastern law, with the
assistance of individual country authors. Mr. Phipps is a senior associate at Wiley Rein & Fielding LLC in
Washington, D.C.
**Jim Phipps, senior associate, Wiley Rein & Fielding LLC, Washington, D.C., and Christopher Scott
Maravilla, JD, 2000, Georgetown University Law Center, currently serving as Law Clerk to Justice Dale
Wainwright, Texas Supreme Court, prepared section I.
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The looming war with Iraq caused the markets, both in the United States and abroad,
to be skittish throughout the year. President George W Bush made it clear in the January
29 State of the Union address to Congress, that confronting Iraq on its continued violations
of United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions and its programs of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) would be the next phase in the War on Terrorism. President Bush
stated that, along with Iran and North Korea, "[sltates like these, and their terrorist allies,
constitute an axis of evil."' As early as February 6, 2003, Colin Powell said in testimony
before the House of Representatives International Relations Committee that a "regime
change [in Iraq] is something the U.S. might have to do alone."2 Later, on October 7, 2002,
Bush elaborated upon this concept in a speech, stating that regime-change also meant a
change by the regime itself, not only a change in regime. The President also commented
on Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions and disarmament, stating that "[t]hese steps

would also change the nature of the Iraqi regime itself. America hopes the regime will make
that choice."3 On September 12, 2002, Bush threw down the gauntlet in a speech to the
U.N. General Assembly stating that "[m]y nation will work with the U.N. Security Council

to meet our common challenge." 4 He went on to say, "[i]f Iraq's regime defies us again, the
world must move deliberately, decisively, to hold Iraq to account."' The challenge was laid

before the U.N. either to enforce its decrees or to become irrelevant.
In response to the efforts of the United States, the Security Council passed Resolution
1441 on November 8, 2002, demanding that Iraq declare whatever weapons of mass destruction it might have in its possession and again open itself to inspections or face "serious
consequences." On December 7, 2002, one day prior to the deadline set in Resolution
1441, Iraq produced its declaration denying it possessed any nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons. By December 11, 2002, seventy U.N. weapons inspectors, led by chief weapons
inspector Han Blix from the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), entered Iraq for the first time since 1998. They began by searching
a site identified by the Iraqis in their dossier provided to the U.N. By the end of the month,
there were about 100 inspectors present in the country inspecting sites associated with Iraq's
nuclear and ballistic missile programs. On December 19, 2002, after the inspections proved
fruitless, the United States declared Iraq to be in "material breach" of Security Council
Resolution 1441.
In a somewhat related move, on December 11, 2002, the United States previewed its sixpage National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the first update of the
document since 1993, to the media just prior to its delivery to Congress. The document
stated that "[tihe United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to
respond with overwhelming force-including through resort to all our options. ' 6 It also
stated that the threat of overwhelming force is an essential part of defense. The document

. President George XV. Bush, The President's State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11 .html.
2. The President'sinternationalAffairs Budget Request for FY 2003: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Int'l
Relations, 107th Cong. 46 (2002).
3. David E. Sanger, Bush Declares U.S. is Using Diplomacy to Disarm Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002,
at Al.
4. In Bush's Words: On Iraq, U.N. Must Face Up to Its Founding Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,2002, at AI0.
5. 1d.
6. Press Release, NationalStrategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec. 2002), availableat http://white
house.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDstrategy.pdf.
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included a commitment to boost programs aimed at containing the damage from any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack and made clear that some states supporting
terrorists already have WMD as they seek to possess such weapons "as tools of coercion
and intimidation."' While this document only restated existing policy, its release was interpreted as a direct warning to Saddam Hussein. In 1991, President George Bush similarly
warned Iraq that it would face severe consequences if it resorted to the use of WMD against
the coalition then assembled to remove Saddam's forces from Kuwait.
As war with Iraq loomed on the horizon, the anti-war movement became more and more
vocal in the United States and abroad. Public figures such as Sean Penn and Susan Sarandon
publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the administration's policies. In his acceptance

speech in Oslo for the Nobel Peace Prize, former President Jimmy Carter gave a critique
of the situation at hand stating, "[flor powerful countries to adopt a principle of preventive
war may well set an example that can have catastrophic consequences.", In a follow-up
interview with the BBC, Carter declined to criticize the Bush administration specifically.
However, the Chairman of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee caused uproar when he
emphatically stated that the granting of the award to President Carter should be interpreted

as a criticism of Bush's Iraq policy.
Continued turmoil affected Israeli domestic politics leading Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
to call for new elections to be held in February 2003, after the Labor Party objected to the
proposed budget that included spending money on settlements in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. Prime Minister Sharon declined to build a government around small right-wing
parties that would have subjected him to a constant threat of no confidence votes. His chief
Likud rival, former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, was brought into the government
as Foreign Minister (he is now the Finance Minister in the new government). The Israeli
economy also continued to suffer the ill effects of the Palestinian intifadah and renewed
terrorism on the part of radical Palestinian groups like Hamas and IslamicJihad as tourism
and foreign investment declined.
Throughout 2002, President Bush reiterated his commitment to the foundation of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the same time, Washington tried to
write off Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. President George W. Bush announced that Arafat
was compromised by terror groups, and hoped that the Palestinians would consider a change
in leadership. In a concession to the world community, Arafat pledged the appointment of
a Prime Minister.
In another controversy affecting the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, on October 6, 2002,
Yasser Arafat signed a two-year-old bill into law namingJerusalem as the Palestinian capital.
This was a mostly symbolic measure in response to a U.S. law signed by President Bush
that moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and recognized Jerusalem as the
Israeli capital on all official documents. The overall policy of the United States has left the
status of Jerusalem to be decided as part of a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Despite the continuing crises in the Middle East, 2002 saw many countries in the region
adopting measures to aid in the War on Terrorism and to liberalize their economies to
encourage greater foreign investment. Some of these measures are outlined in the individual
country reports below.

7. Id.
8. Frank Bruni, CarterAccepts Nobel and Gives Message on lraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 2002, at Al.
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II. Egypt*
Little development has taken place in the legislative arena in Egypt since the publication
of the Egypt section in the 2001 Middle Eastern Commercial Law Year-in-Review report.
Egypt's legislature (the People's Assembly) continued to debate the new Labor Law,
reaching article 60 of the estimated 270 articles. The new law aims at increasing private
sector involvement in the labor market and at the same time achieving a balance between
employees' and employers' rights. Among the most important issues to be addressed in the
new law is increased freedom for the employer to dismiss employees, a right that has been
eagerly anticipated by businesses as the national economic situation continued to decline.
The income tax law also remained under debate before the People's Assembly. The new
law would introduce a unified tax system and decrease taxes, making it both easier and less
expensive for taxpayers. At the same time, the decrease in tax is expected to be balanced by
an increase in enforcement and a reduction in cases of tax evasion. While waiting for the
law, the government has opted to deal with the large number of tax evasion and tax dispute
cases by encouraging their settlement as an alternative to prosecution. This brought a sharp
decrease in the number of prosecutions and closed a considerable number of cases, which
somewhat relieved an already overburdened court system.
The draft anti-trust and competition law has still not reached the People's Assembly.
The final draft was issued by the Ministry of Supply and is currently in the last process of
review by a committee of the National Democratic Party (NDP).
The various ministries implicated by the passage of the new Intellectual Property Law
issued in June of 2002 continued to wrangle over the form of the law's executive regulations,
which were still not issued at the time of writing. There is concern that the new law does
not bring Egypt into compliance with certain international agreements, such as its agreement with the European Union specifically, in the area of protection of plant varieties. It
is expected that the executive regulations, when issued, will address some of these concerns.
In the meantime, the People's Assembly passed the Special Economic Zones Law on
June 5, 2002 and the executive regulations were issued on September 21, 2002. The law is
designed to boost manufacturing and export industries through tax and customs incentives.
No special economic zones have been declared yet, but it is anticipated that the NorthWest Suez Gulf and East Port-Said areas will be declared as such shortly, due to their
proximity to major ports, and their developed infrastructure.
In the same vein, the People's Assembly passed the Export Promotion Law on June 18,
2002, which seeks to improve the customs rebate system for exporters by establishing a
central unit, under the joint supervision of the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Trade, to
oversee the system. It also establishes an "export promotion fund" financed at least in part
by fees imposed on imports.
However, perhaps the most significant change to affect Egypt's trading position was the
floatation of the Egyptian pound and the abandonment of the pegged central rate against
the U.S. dollar. The decision resulted in an almost immediate currency devaluation of 15
percent and ostensibly eliminated the thriving black market for foreign currency. In reality,
however, the government, although allowing banks to set their own exchange rates for
foreign currency, continues to restrict them in their sales of foreign currency to customers.

*The report on Egypt was prepared by Arnr Abbas and Fatma Salah, Ibrachy & Dermarkar, Cairo, Egypt.
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Banks have been turning away customers seeking to buy foreign currency on the pretext
that they must have a "legitimate business reason" to purchase foreign currency, such as
opening letters of credit. The situation remains somewhat volatile and speculation as to
further devaluation continues.

m. Iraq*
During 2002, the crippling effect of comprehensive economic sanctions, imposed by the
U.N. since 1990, was aggravated by the persistent threat of war against Iraq.
At the beginning of this year, the United States declared that Iraq, amongst other countries, formed an axis of evil allegedly considered a potential threat to international peace
and security. This was followed by an escalation of military mobilization in neighboring
countries for an offensive on Iraq with the expressed intention of disarming it of its weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and of regime change.
The threat of military action was coupled with extensive international diplomatic activity
culminating in the U.N. Security Council adoption, in November, of a new Resolution
1441 described as Iraq's last chance to remove its WMD. This Resolution entrusted the
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with this task. The Resolution further provided a warning
that Iraq would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations.
Even though the UNMOVIC and the IAEA began their monitoring, verification, and
inspection activities late in 2002 and reported their findings to the Security Council, the
military build up was intensified. Consequently, the general view in Iraq that war was preeminent created an obvious atmosphere of anxiety and apprehension.
In spite of the expectations and preparations for war, life in Iraq generally continued in
a fairly normal manner. The application of the Food for Oil Resolutions and the arrangements agreed upon with the U.N. in the Memorandum of Understanding continued to be
applied. Trade with neighboring countries, directly and through the established free zones,
also continued. However, the year did not see increased activity in the area of new legislation
as would be expected under the prevailing critical circumstances.
IV. Libya**
Libya has joined the international effort to combat organized crime and terrorism by
taking measures to prevent money laundering and illegal use of money transfers. A new
Executive Regulation for Law No. 5 of 1997 for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital
Investment addresses some of the shortcomings of the law and a new legal regime for
conducting economic activities.
A.

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES

On May 28, 2002, the Governor of the Libyan Central Bank issued Decision No. 40 of
2002 (Decision) for the Establishment of a Financial Information Unit within The Central

*Sabah M. A. Mahmoud prepared the report on Iraq. Mr. Mahmoud isa consultant in Middle East law
practicing in London at Gulf Legal Services Ltd.
*Abdudayem M. Elgharabli prepared the report on Libya. Mr. Elgharabli isa partner in the Tripoli - Libya
based Law Firm of Mukhtar, Kelbash & Elgharabli.
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Bank of Libya. The objective of this unit is to monitor and follow up all transactions

conducted by the banks that are suspected to be related to illegal money laundering operations or deposit or transfer of funds from unknown sources. Article 5 of the Decision dictates
that all commercial banks should establish similar units to serve as liaisons with the new
unit in the Central Bank. The Decision was followed by a Circular issued by the Governor
on the same date containing detailed procedures for controlling money laundering operations. In the introduction, the Circular stated that the Central Bank "feels bound to adopt
the measures necessary to protect our country from the money laundering phenomena and

to extend a helping hand to the international entities entrusted with facing such phenomena
on the international level."

B. NEW

EXECUTIVE REGULATION FOR THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

Taking into consideration the critical remarks made by foreign and local business people,
lawyers, and commentators, the executive branch (Council of Ministers) tried a short cut
to address these criticisms. Instead of going the long route of changing Law No. 5 of 1997,
a new Executive Regulation was issued by the General Peoples' Committee on March 3,
2002 to replace the previous regulation issued in 1998. The new regulation was aimed at
solving some legal and procedural issues that arose from the provisions of the law and the
previous regulation, the most important of which is to clarify and simplify the registration
process and to ensure that the investment project enjoys full legal personality. Article 10 of
the new regulation provides for the establishment of an Investment Register within the
Investment Authority wherein all licensed projects have to be registered. Article 11 provides
that "registration in the Investment Register shall have all effects resulting from registering
in the Commercial Register, including the juridical personality." Article 2 made the evaluation of the contribution in kind much easier than in the previous regulation. Now, such
evaluation is conducted by a specialized technical committee formed by the Secretary of
the Investment Authority, among its members is a representative of the Investor. The new
regulation simplified the procedures required for the transfer of the investor's profits and
the repatriation of the capital in cases of liquidation, expiration of the project's term, or
sale of all or part of the project.
C.

NEW LEGAL REGIME FOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Law No. 21 of 2001 Concerning Certain Provisions for Conducting Economic Activities
was issued on December 28, 2001. The Executive Regulation for implementing this law
was issued onJuly 1, 2002. According to this law, the instruments for conducting economic
activities are limited to the following: individuals; family business; partnerships; joint stock
companies; and state-owned companies and corporations. The minimum capital required
to incorporate a joint stock company is one hundred thousand Libyan Dinars (LD 100,000),
30 percent of which should be paid upon incorporation. Nominal value of each share should
not exceed LD 100. The Law puts a cap on the number of shares that can be owned by an
individual shareholder and his family members. It is 8 percent for companies whose capital
is LD I million or less, 4 percent for capital of LD 2 million or less, 2 percent for capital
of LD 4 million LD, and 1 percent for a capital exceeding LD 4 million.
For the first time in the post-September 1 revolution era, the law envisaged the establishment of a stock market and authorized the Cabinet to organize it. The Executive Regulation identified the bodies that are eligible to establish and manage the stock market as
VOL. 37, NO. 3
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those which are conducting financial, banking, or investment activities. The regulation
envisages the possibility of foreign participation in running the stock market. No minimum
or maximum limit is set for such foreign participation. The details of organizing a stock
market will be embodied in a specific decision to be issued by the Cabinet authorizing and
regulating the activities of such stock market.
V. Morocco*
A.

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

Morocco held legislative elections on September 27, 2002, through a single-round list
voting system that put forward candidates on regional and national lists. In what was considered the country's first free and fair elections, voters elected 295 new representatives to
the majlis al-nuwdb (Assembly of Representatives) for a five-year term at the regional level,
with thirty additional seats reserved for female candidates elected at the national level.
Among the 22 parties entering the new Parliament, the five leading parties were: the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (social-democrat) with 50 seats, the Independence Party
(national-democrat) with 48 seats, the Justice and Development Party (Islamist) with 42
seats, the National Rally of Independents (conservative) with 41 seats, and the Popular
9
Movement (conservative) with 27 seats. In the context of the ongoing electoral campaign,
the Minister of awqdf(Endowments) and Islamic Affairs announced on June 13, 2002, that
it would be illegal for "friday preachers to indulge in any partisan or electoral propaganda,"
0
adding that any infractions would be punished.' Following the elections, King Muhammad
VI named acting Interior Minister Driss Jettou as Prime Minister on October 9, 2002,
pursuant to article 24 of the constitution, replacing Abderrahmane Youssoufi.
B.

ELECTORAL LAW

On May 6, 2002, the Assembly of Representatives unanimously adopted a new electoral
law, which introduced a list voting system rather than a uninominal vote. OnJune 28, 2002,
the majlis ad-dustfiri (Constitutional Council) declared certain provisions of the electoral
law unconstitutional and expressed reservations regarding further provisions, prompting
the government to reexamine the law. The high court decision: (1) objected to the provision
that prohibited members of the majlisal-mustashdrin(Assembly of Councilors) from running
for elections in the Assembly of Representatives-noting that members of the upper chamber may run for a seat in the lower chamber, but, if elected, must choose between the two
seats afterwards; (2) objected to the provision that assimilated votes for a regional list as an
implicit vote for the same national list-stipulating electors to vote with a single ballot
paper for candidates on the regional list and national list; and (3) expressed reservations
with respect to the provision that candidacy is conditioned on belonging to a political
party-indicating that candidates who do not belong to a political party indeed have the
right to participate in the elections. On July 2, 2002, the Council of Ministers adopted two

*Farhad Ghaussy prepared the report on Morocco.
9. Pousie islamist a l'occasion desilections legislatives au Maroc, LE MONDE, Sept. 30, 2002; see also Operation
ilictionspropres,L'EXPRESS, Sept. 26, 2002.
10. Agence France Presse, Morocco bans 'partisanpropaganda' in Mosques, June 13, 2002.

FALL 2003

978

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

amendments meant to adapt the electoral law to the Constitutional Council ruling; the
Assembly of Councilors adopted the revised law on July 25, 2002."
C. FINANCE LAw
The Assembly of Representatives approved the 2003 finance law on December 25, 2002,
by a majority of 108 votes (with 43 votes against). The law sets the overall state budget for
2003 at DH 139.51 billion, including DH 19.52 billion for investment expenses, representing a 2.05 percent decrease from the previous year. The finance law envisions raising
DH 12.5 billion from the privatization of eight industries, including the Regie des Tabacs
(the tobacco company), which has gone to tender and is expected to raise U.S.$800 in
2003.12
D. PRESS CODE
On May 6, 2002, final approval was given to the new Press Code despite criticism from
the Moroccan press union and international press associations regarding the coercive nature
of the law. Although the new law reduces penalties and fines for offending journalists and
creates easier procedures for launching a new publication, the law retains jail terms for
defamation of the king and the royal family (punishable by three to five years in prison). In
addition, article 77 of the law permits the Ministry of the Interior to seize publications that
are deemed to disturb public order. Article 29 of the law also allows the government to ban
Moroccan or foreign newspapers that are deemed to "undermine Islam, the monarchy,
national territorial integrity or public order."' 3

VI. Oman*
The year 2002 started with the world still in a state of shock following the events of 9/
11 and the continuing efforts to track down Osama bin Laden and other members of alQaeda. On the southern borders, there was increased security because of the perceived
threat from the Yemen Arab Republic, but overall the Sultanate of Oman remained politically stable and unaffected by international terrorism. U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan
initially resulted in some peaceful protests but they were short-lived. More fundamental
was the public disapproval of the U.S.-stated intentions with regard to the removal of
Saddam Hussain in Iraq, which many Omanis regard as a purely internal matter or one
that should be resolved between Arab nations. One should not forget that Oman was the
only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state that maintained its embassy in Baghdad
throughout the Gulf War and it is proud of its reputation as a conciliator. In recent times,
it has successfully reached amicable settlements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen with regard to border disputes and the only major outstanding
land issues are with Iran in relation to the islands of Greater and Lesser Thumb.

11. BBC Monitoring International Reports, Morocco: Governmentadopts amendedlaws on elections, July 3,2002.
12. MEED Quarterly Report, Morocco: Upturn Greeted with Caution, Dec. 18, 2002.
13. Agence France Presse, Morocco Parliamentapproves controversialpress code, May 6, 2002; see also Une riforme
maintient lespeines de prison pour les dilits de presse au Maroc, LE MONDE, May 23, 2002.
*A.R. Neale of the Said Al Shahry Law Office prepared the report on Oman.
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International perception of instability in the region had one major effect on Oman in
2002. This instability caused the withdrawal by Hillwood, controlled by Ross Perot Jr.,
from its proposed role as a founding shareholder in Salalah Free Zone Company and manager of this 6,000-acre development next to Salalah Port in the southern governorate of
Dhofar. The Government remains committed to the project and discussions with other
parties are under way concerning the construction, development, management, and marketing of the Free Zone, which is ideally located for manufacturing and warehousing facilities servicing East-West trade and also East and South Africa. Following completion of
a new natural gas pipeline and the construction of a new gas-fired power station (expected
in March 2003) there will be ample power resources. Dhofar is also an area that is rich in
minerals and offers considerable tourism development potential.
On the other hand, apart from reduced occupancy in luxury hotels, other industrial and
tourism projects were largely unaffected and one saw considerable progress with:
* The Oman-India Fertiliser project in Sur
* The Government Train Project in Sur (expansion of the Oman LNG plant)
* Various industrial projects in Sohar to the north of Muscat, following the completion of
a new natural gas pipeline. These include:
* An independent water and power project (IWPP)
* A polypropylene plant
* An oil refinery
* An aluminium smelter
* A fertiliser project
The following are currently in various stages of development and financing:
* The Joint Technical College for the Ministry of Defence
* Various private universities
* Various hotels and tourism resorts
Two well-publicized projects remain in limbo, the privatisation of the Oman Telecommunications Company and the Muscat Waste Water Treatment project, although in the
latter case the Government is reported to have appointed a financial adviser and has awarded
a survey contract to locate and map all existing underground pipes, drains, and cables in
the Capital Area.
On the legal front, 2002 saw an amendment to the Law of Commercial Companies and
the adoption of far stricter rules for good corporate governance of joint stock companies,

both private (closed) and public. In this area, Oman leads the way among GCC countries,
but as is always the case with this kind of regulatory framework, the problem will be finding
adequate resources to enforce it. The country is still awaiting a major overhaul of the
Labour Law and the Commercial Companies Law, which may see the complete abolition
of limited liability companies (LLCs). In the meantime, however, the Government has
bowed to pressure and may now, in certain circumstances, permit the formation of LLCs
with a paid-up capital as low as RO 3,000 (U.S.$7,750), instead of RO 20,000 (U.S.$51,600)
for wholly Omani owned companies. The minimum capital for partially foreign-owned
LLCs remains RO 150,000 (U.S.$387,000), which in our view represents a major disincentive for inward investment.
Finally, on the economic front, the GCC states have agreed to adopt a common customs
duty tariff (generally speaking 5 percent), which will remove some of the anomalies in the
FALL 2003
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present system and reduce the risk of parallel imports, as well as boosting inter-GCC trade.
Agreement has also been reached, in principle, to adopt a common currency in the GCC,
following the example of the Euro, but much work remains to be done and full implementation will take several years.
VII. Pakistan*
In 2002, the Government of Pakistan continued its efforts to strengthen the corporate
sector and develop a broad-based regulatory platform for economic growth. During the
year, the geo-political situation in the region had a direct effect on Pakistan's economy,
however, a number of important ordinances relating to the corporate sector were promulgated by the President of Pakistan with a view to encourage internal and external investment
in the country. We are summarizing hereunder the significant corporate law developments
in Pakistan in the year 2002.
A.

CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has formulated the Code
of Corporate Governance (Code). The Code has been issued by the SECP with an aim to
establish a framework of good corporate governance whereby a listed company shall be
managed in compliance with the corporate practices stipulated in the Code. The Karachi,
Lahore, and Islamabad Stock Exchanges have amended their listing regulations to incorporate the provisions of the Code.
B.

COMPANIES (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE 2002 AND COMPANIES (SECOND AMENDMENT)
ORDINANCE 2002

These Ordinances were promulgated to amend the Companies Ordinance 1984 (Ordinance). Through the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 2002, amendments have been
made primarily in the provisions of the Ordinance relating to different modes of forming
a company; the procedure involved in the transfer of shares of a company; general meetings
of a company; minimum number of directors of a company; investment in associated companies, undertakings, accounts, and financial statements of a company; the role of auditors;
the audit of a company; and the role of liquidators. The Companies (Second Amendment)
Ordinance 2002 enhances the ambit of the Ordinance to include provisions relating to the
establishment and regulation of non-banking finance companies. In a related development,
the regulation of non-banking finance companies, earlier controlled by the State Bank of
Pakistan, has now been placed under the authority of the SECP
C.

LISTED COMPANIES (SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITION OF VOTING SHARES AND TAKE-OVERS)
ORDINANCE 2002

This Ordinance was promulgated with an aim to provide for fair and equal treatment to
all the investors, as well as to establish a transparent and efficient system for substantial

*Ahsan Zahir Rizvi and Hasan Anwar Rizvi prepared the report on Pakistan. Mr. Ahsan Rizvi is a partner
and Mr. Hasan Rizvi is a senior associate in the law firm of Rizvi, Isa & Hosain. For further information, please

contact us through email at ric@cyber.net.pk or visit www.rihlaw.com.
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acquisition of voting shares and take-overs of listed companies and matters ancillary thereto
or connected therewith. There are different requirements that have been imposed on an
acquirer of shares in a listed company relating to disclosure of information, additional
acquisition of voting shares, consolidation of holdings, public announcements, and certain
other general obligations. This ordinance also imposes certain general obligations on the
target company's Board of Directors.

VIII. Palestine*
The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) called for national reform in May and June
of 2002. The call for reform came at a time when the PNA had fallen short in various areas,

including:
* providing for the rule of law;
* establishing a clear regulatory framework;

* promoting political accountability; and
* ensuring the efficient administration of public functions.
The executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the PNA needed to be separated. The
PNA needed to promote a strong financial system, reduce anticompetitive practices, increase the accountability of the public sector, improve PNA revenue administration, and
raise the efficiency of the public sector by allowing the private sector to compete in service

delivery.
In response to the PNA's call for reform, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)
prepared a reform agenda that included:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

enacting the Basic Law and the Law on the Independence of the Judiciary;
establishing a constitutional court and abolishing the security court;
holding general elections (presidential, legislature, and local government);
safeguarding public freedoms;
restructuring the office of the Executive branch and the Cabinet;
ensuring transparency on public expenditures and financials of the PNA;
restructuring security forces and the public accountant's office;
restructuring local government and municipalities;
improving the performance of the civil service and reducing their numbers;
improving the performance of the judicial and court system;
maintaining separation of powers and the independence of the Judiciary; and
creating a High Judicial Council.

On June 23, 2002, the PNA issued the 100 Days Plan of the PalestinianGovernment (100
Days Plan). The 100 Days Plan describes how the PNA intends to become "more efficient
and effective in the service of the national good.' 4 The 100 Days Plan sets out an agenda
covering five domains: (1) the general domain; (2) the public security domain; (3) the fiscal
domain; (4) the judicial domain; and (5) other domains. The details of these domains are
outlined below. Despite a continued economic downturn throughout 2002, the PNA re-

*Hiba Husseini, a partner in the law firm of Husseini & Dajani, prepared the report on Palestine.
14. 100 Days Plan of the Palestinian Government (June 23, 2002) (unofficial translation), available at http:/
/www.ndi.org/worldwide/mena/gaza/100daysp.pdf.
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mained committed to enacting legislation to support economic development and proceed
with its reform program.
A.

BANKING LAW AND MONETARY AUTHORITY LAW

The Banking Law enacted in 2002 supplemented the Palestinian Monetary Authority
Law of 1997 (PMA Law) and set clear guidelines for banking activities and transactions.
The PMA Law set the standards for required capital, reserves, rules for mergers, and Islamic

banking practices. The PMA Law contains extensive provisions for the licensing and supervision of banks by the PMA. The PMA Law also regulates and licenses all banks, local
and foreign alike. Under the PMA Law, the Palestinian Monetary Authority supervises
banking transactions and relations between banks, as well as regulates foreign currency
exchange and sets financial and credit policies. A new banking law based on international
standards is being adopted presently.
B.

LEAsING LAW

A Leasing Law is to be enacted in 2003, pending the comprehensive review of the income
tax law. Leasing will facilitate and expand lending. All leases of more than one year, or that
extend more than one year will be subject to registration. Under the new law, the lessor
and lessee have special obligations and warranties towards each other and the risk of loss
remains with the lessor.
C.

COMPANY LAW

A newly revised Company Law is expected to be enacted by the end of 2003. It is expected
to eliminate existing requirements for par value of the share and stated capital and simplifies
the incorporation procedures. The law includes special features, such as harmony between
the registration and incorporation process and the application of uniform fees to both the
West Bank and Gaza.
D.

BAsic LAW

The promulgation of the Basic Law on May 29, 2002 gave the PNA a "constitutional"
basis for its powers. The Basic Law went through various drafts over a period of years. The
work was started in 1993 by the PLO's Executive Committee. The changes in the geopolitical conditions, the Oslo process, the first Palestinian elections in 1996, and the formation
of the PLC impacted the shape of the present Basic Law and its operations.
Thus, the entry into force of the Basic Law was a turning point for the PNA on the
internal level. The Basic Law provides for a parliamentary democracy based on the rule of
law and separation of powers. It calls for a free market as the basis of the Palestinian
economy. It calls for freedom of speech, guaranteed personal freedom, and freedom of
religion. It upholds the independence of the Judiciary. It calls for the establishment of a
constitutional court and provides for judicial review, in the meantime, the Supreme Court
is empowered to assume this role. The Basic Law creates a system of checks and balances
giving the PLC the power to hold the Executive accountable and the same is true of the
Executive over the PLC. The Basic Law empowers the PLC to launch investigations concerning the conduct of members of the Executive.
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ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

After seven years of Palestinian self-rule, the PNA promulgated the Law on the Independence of the Judiciary (LIJ), which went into force on May 14, 2002. This step was
important because LIJ confirmed the separation of powers issue articulated in the Basic
Law and made the Judiciary independent. The LIJ created the independent High Judicial
Council and empowered the Judiciary to maintain its independence from interferences by
the Executive. The LIJ also specifies the types and jurisdiction of courts. There are religious
courts for personal status matters, a constitutional court, a supreme court, and three levels
of lower courts that have varied personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The appointment
and promotion of judges is independent. The High Judicial Council recommends judges
and the President confirms. Judges cannot be removed except for cause, as specified in LIJ,
and the High Judicial Council is in charge of their promotion. The critical aspect of the
Law is the creation of an independent judicial organ charged with the administration and
training of judges. This is a major departure from the vacuum that existed prior to the
promulgation of the Law and a shift in the concentration of powers in the hands of the
Executive. The Executive is no longer in charge of the Judiciary, it has confirmation power
only. Furthermore, the newly promulgated Basic Law and LIJ will help to clear the blurred
lines between the Minister ofJustice, the Chief Justice, and the Attorney General. Previously, the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice believed that they held the same responsibilities, such as the appointment of judges, the composition of the High Judicial
Council, and a number of administrative judicial issues; this is no longer the case.
IX. Qatar: Qatar Court Challenges Agency LawImplications for Foreign Investors*
Under the leadership of the Amir, H.H. Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa AI-Thani, Qatar saw
many changes in 2002. In its military efforts, Qatar took unprecedented steps to expand its
defense ties with the United States. The U.S. Central Command finally moved its command
and control headquarters from Tampa, Florida to As-Sayliyah, Qatar, and realized its dream
to establish an airbase in A-Udeid, Qatar, to complement its existing naval base in Bahrain.
The USCENTCOM will be there to stay long after the Iraq conflict is resolved.
On the political front, on July 3, 2002, the Amir began to review a draft of a.
permanent
Constitution, and on November 12, he established the first ever National Human Rights
Commission. Also, on March 26, H.H. Hamad, known as L'Enfant Terrible du Gulf, challenged the region's political status quo by organizing the historic conference titled "Democracy and Free Trade." The Amir used this conference to impress upon the Arab leaders
the need to establish democratic institutions and promote free trade without the old social
and economic barriers, such as the requirement that a local commercial agent be appointed
in order for a foreign company to do business.
The Amir had in mind his own version of Law No. 13 in which he called for unencum-

*The Honorable Joseph Ghougassian prepared the report on Qatar. The Hon. Joseph Ghougassian, Ph.D.,
J.D. (1980) is with Arabian Gulf Consultants, Inc. in San Diego, CA. He was the U.S. Ambassador to Qatar
from 1985 until 1989. He has assisted several American and European multinational corporations in doing
business in Qatar and the GCC and has represented Qatari companies in international arbitration.
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5
bered free trade. Law No. 13 ends the monopoly of authorized local dealers of branded
foreign goods. Law No. 13 also removes article 13 from Qatar Law No. 4 of 1986, which
provided protection to local agents of foreign goods against the import of the brands by
anyone except those given special permission from the Ministry of Finance, Economy, and
Trade. Law No. 4 of 1986 originally dealt with commercial agents.
The intent of Law No. 13 is not only to encourage foreign companies to invest in Qatar,
but to make the local market competitive and free. The move is also likely to bring prices
of commodities down due to increased competition, which will benefit consumers at large.
On the legal front, the courts in Qatar, taking their cues from the political climate and the
new foreign investment law No. 13, challenged indirectly the old social and economic
doctrine of the "local commercial agent" embedded in Law No. 4.
Law No. 4 was legislated in 1986. The law incorporated the cultural business mentality
prevalent in Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The cultural business mentality of the GCC was that any business relationship between a local investor and a foreign
company was a relationship of agent to principal, notwithstanding what the parties may
have agreed. Moreover, the cultural business mentality insisted that the agent be treated as
the "exclusive" representative of the foreign company, notwithstanding the language of the
contract. This cultural business mentality of exclusivity was the basis for the immigration
law requirement in Qatar, and the GCC requirement that any representative from a foreign
company be sponsored by its commercial agent in order to receive an entry/exit visa.
Dr. Hassan Kamel, the late Legal Advisor to the former Amir Khalifa, and the author of
Law No. 4, once explained that the legislative policies of Qatar and the other members of
the GCC were to promote the commercial idea of agent, when dealing with international
trade, franchises, and foreign investors. This policy was, however, challenged in a landmark
case involving an automobile dealer franchise.

A.

MIDDLE EAST TRADERS V. UNITED CARS ALMANA

Middle East Traders (MET) was the dealer of Chrysler and Dodge vehicles since 1962.
United Cars Almana (UCA) has been the dealer of Jeep vehicles since 1990. On April 23,
1998, Chrysler terminated the dealership of MET, and shortly thereafter, in 1998, it transferred the franchise to UCA. The written termination reason given by Chrysler to MET
stated that MET had not signed and returned the dealership agreement to Chrysler in July
1996. MET explained that it was an administrative oversight and that the business transactions between the parties continued during the period of time in question. MET noted
that Chrysler never reminded MET to return the signed agreement, which had an end date
of December 31, 1998.
On January 2, 1999, UCA applied for a permit to import the Chrysler, Dodge, and Jeep
products. On February 2, 1999, the Director of Commercial Affairs in the Ministry of
Finance, Economy and Trade, denied UCA the permit citing the commercial agency law,
Law No. 4 of 1986, which authorized MET as the only commercial agent to import the
Chrysler and Dodge products. That same day, UCA was also denied permission to enter
the new dealership in the registry of commercial agents because MET was the sole registered commercial agent.

15. SeeJoseph Ghougassian, Qatar'sNew Foreign Investment Law No. 13 of the Year 2000,36 INT'L LAW. 93335 (2002).
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Armed with these two official rejection letters, on February 16, 1999, MET filed a complaint for damages against UCA and Chrysler (Case 127/99). On February 27, 1999, MET
sought and was granted three separate injunctions against UCA (Case 5 1/99). The court
enjoined Chrysler from transferring MET's franchise to UCA, prohibited the Qatar customs agency to give clearance to UCA's importation of Chrysler and Dodge vehicles, and
directed UCA to remove the existing Chrysler and Dodge cars from its show rooms. These
injunctions were to remain until the court decided the merits of lawsuit 127/99, filed by
MET. On October 11, 1999, UCA succeeded in having another court lift the injunctions
(Case 210/99).
On May 30, 2001, the court addressed the merits of MET's lawsuit No. 127/99. In its
complaint, MET relied heavily on Commercial Agency Law No. 4 of 1986. MET argued
that the law prohibited a franchisor from appointing more than one franchisee in the same
geographical territory. MET claimed that it had been the sole registered agent for the
Chrysler and Dodge products in Qatar since 1962. It introduced into evidence two certifications, issued in 2000 and 2001 by the Ministry, confirming MET's status as the commercial agent, along with the two letters from the Ministry that had denied UCA's requests
to register its new dealership on the ground that it violated the Commercial Agency Law
No. 4. Moreover, MET introduced two letters from Chrysler in 1985 and 1986, stating
that MET had been the "sole authorized distributor" of its products since 1962. In addition,
MET explained that notwithstanding the terms and conditions of the contract, it was an
exclusive distributor because article 1 of Law No. 4 designates the Ministry as the competent
authority to issue MET a commercial agent license and collect the appropriate fees. MET
concluded that Chrysler was not the competent authority to license commercial agents.
The court rejected MET's arguments that Law No. 4 applied to its claims. Instead, the
court examined the 1990 contract between MET and Chrysler and liberally applied the
terms and conditions to the relationship. In reaching its conclusions, the court referenced
the contract clauses, which stated that the distributorship agreement did not create an
agency relationship. It held that MET was not an "exclusive" distributor; that Chrysler
could appoint other distributors for the same products in the same area; that Chrysler could
terminate the agreement with or without cause; and that Chrysler could sell directly to any
other party. As for the two letters written by Chrysler in 1985 and 1986, clarifying that
MET was the "sole authorized distributor," the court identified a section in the contract
that stated that all prior agreements were superseded by the 1990 contract. The court did
not consider the historical relationship of the parties, which dated back to 1962, or the
historical basis behind Law No. 4. It was content in applying a literal analysis of the terms
in the last contract executed in 1990.
Article 19 in Law No. 4, states that the Ministry of Finance, Economy and Trade "shall
issue bills and decisions necessary for the implementation of this law." Yet, the court dismissed the opinion of the Ministry of Finance, Economy and Trade which asserted that
MET was the lawful commercial agent and, therefore, Law No. 4 was to apply in this case.
Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the Ministry was the licensing authority
in determining who is a commercial agent. The court concluded that the terms of the
contract are the controlling forces in determining the relationship, rights, and obligations
between the parties.
The court wrote:

"...

on understanding the terms of this agreement, we find that this

agreement is clear and express and does not include any elements of a commercial agency.
It is only a sale and purchase" of Chrysler's products.
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1. Implicationsfor Foreign Investors
The case Middle East Traders v. United Cars Almana (127/99) has significant implications

for foreign investors, manufacturers, and franchisors seeking to do business in Qatar. The
business implication of this ruling is that a foreign investor is no longer bound to appoint
one local representative or distributor. The investor can have more than one local representative to promote its goods and services. Furthermore, the investor can avoid the legal
traps of commercial agency and the financial liabilities outlined in Law No. 4 by drafting
its agreement with terms that deny the agency relationship, territorial exclusivity, the Qatar
choice of law, and the Qatar choice of forum, while reserving its rights to appoint other
representatives, distributors, or franchisees, and to terminate the contract with or without
cause.
The court, with its decision in METv. UCA, has for all purposes and intentions weakened
the commercial agent's historical importance and power has shifted to the local Ministries'
legislative authority to regulate commerce, trade, and business relationships to the parties
16

through "freedom of contract.1

This legal and business situation will continue until the Government of Qatar legislates
its own franchise laws, similar to those found in each U.S. state, subordinating the parties'

freedom of contract to the state and federal franchise laws.

16. On January 29, 2000, the Qatar Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's ruling in the case of New
Trade Engineering v.BMW and Al FardanAutomobiles (Case No. 154 & 165/99). BMW terminated the vehicle
franchise of New Trade Engineering (NTE) and transferred it to Al Fardan Automobiles (AFA). The lower
court, relying on the traditional business mentality of the market, called NTE an exclusive commercial agent,
despite the terms of its contract, which clearly stated that NTE was neither an agent of BMW nor did it have
exclusivity in selling BMW's products. The court applied the commercial agency Law No. 4 to force AFA to
buyback NTE's cars and parts. On appeal, the higher court read literally the terms of NTE's contract and
concluded that the agreement did not qualify NTE as an agent or exclusive distributor, but as an importer.
Yet, Law No. 4 is about commercial agents. Furthermore, the court of appeal noted that NTE never registered
its dealership with the Ministry of Finance as required by Law No. 4. The facts in this case are very different
from MET. MET v. UCA remains the landmark ruling to be cited by foreign investors to avoid the application
of the commercial agency Law No. 4.
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